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A TRIBUTE TO FRANKLIN D. CLECKLEY
Pursuant to W. Va. Code § 3-5-23(a) (1986), the deadline for
filing with the secretary of state the certificate and fee for a person
seeking ballot access as a candidate for the office of president or
vice-president as the nominee of a third-party otherwise qualifying
for inclusion on the general election ballot by method other than
primary election is the first day of August preceding the general
election, and such persons are not required to file a declaration of
candidacy pursuant to W. Va. Code § 3-5-7 (1991). 4"8
D. Setting Aside an Election
State ex rel. Sowards v. County Commission ofLincoln County439 examined
nullification of an election. Justice Cleckley wrote that "[t]o achieve the goal of
enfranchisement wherever possible, judicial authority to take a candidate off the
ballot, especially after the voters have expressed their preference in a primary
election, should be sparingly used." ' The opinion then held
[p]olitical candidacy is a fundamental interest which can be trod
upon only if less restrictive alternatives are not available. It is only
when an election has been subverted by a candidate's clear
constitutional or statutory disqualification, bribery, fraud,
intimidation, or similar unlawful conduct that a court should
invalidate the preference of the voters and, in effect, annul the
election. Therefore, a mere violation of W. Va. Code, 7-14-15(a)
(1971), prohibiting deputy sheriffs from engaging in partisan
political activity, is insufficient to set aside an election and, in
effect, disenfranchise the voters of a county.44' -
XX. APPELLATE PROCEDURE
A. Appellate Jurisdiction
In order for the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to hear and decide
438 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
439 474 S.E.2d 919 (W. Va. 1996).
440 Id. at Syl. Pt. 7.
441 Id. at Syl. Pt. 8.
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upon the merits of a case, it must have jurisdiction over the matter. In James MB.
v. Carolyn M. 2 the issue ofjurisdiction presented itself:
A court of limited appellate jurisdiction is obliged to examine its
own power to hear a particular case. This Court's jurisdictional
authority is either endowed by the West Virginia Constitution or
conferred by the West Virginia Legislature. Therefore, this Court
has a responsibility sua sponte to examine the basis of its own
jurisdiction. 3
The opinion concluded that "[w]here neither party to an appeal raises, briefs, or
argues a jurisdictional question presented, this Court has the inherent power and
duty to determine unilaterally its authority to hear a particular case. Parties cannot
confer jurisdiction on this Court directly or indirectly where it is otherwise
lacking."''"
It was also said in James MB. that "[u]nder W. Va. Code, 58-5-1 (1925),
appeals only may be taken from final decisions of a circuit court. A case is final
only when it terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits of the case
and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been
determined.""' 5
In State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac-Buick; Inc,"6 the issue of
determining whether an order dismissing a case is a final appealable order was
addressed:
The key to determining if an order is final is not whether the
language from Rule 54(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure is included in the order, but is whether the order
approximates a final order in its nature and effect. We extend
application of this rule to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. 47
442 456 S.E.2d 16 (W. Va. 1995).
443 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
4" Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
445 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
446 461 S.E.2d 516 (W. Va. 1995).
447 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
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In Coleman v. Sopher,"4 the issue of appellate jurisdiction was addressed in the
context of a party obtaining a new trial, but attempting an appeal nonetheless:
When a party agrees to or requests a new trial, and a new trial is
granted because of the agreement or request, a denial of appellate
review is justified on the ground that the party has elected to accept
the new trial and should be bound, as if the party had entered a
settlement agreement to forego appeal of the order granting a new
trial. 49
The issues of ripeness for appeal and the running of the appeal clock were discussed
in McCormick v. Allstate Insurance Co.:450
A motion made pursuant to Rule 59(a) of the West Virginia Rules
of Civil Procedure and filed within ten days of judgment being
entered suspends the finality of the judgment and makes the
judgment unripe for appeal. When the time for an appeal is so
extended, its full length begins to run from the date of entry of the
order disposing of the motion."'
B. Standards of Review
1. Admissibility of a Confession
The standard of review by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in
determining the admissibility of a confession was set out in State v. Farley:
452
This Court is constitutionally obligated to give plenary,
independent, and de novo review to the ultimate question of
whether a particular confession is voluntary and whether the lower
court applied the correct legal standard in making its
determination. The holdings of prior West Virginia cases
448 459 S.E.2d 367 (W. Va. 1995).
449 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
450 459 S.E.2d 359 (W. Va. 1995).
451 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
452 452 S.E.2d 50 (W. Va. 1994).
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suggesting deference in this area continue, but that deference is
limited to factual findings as opposed to legal conclusions.4" 3
Farley further held, "[i]n circumstances where a trial court admits a confession
without making specific findings as to the totality of the circumstances, the
admission of the confession will nevertheless be upheld on appeal, but only if a
reasonable review of the evidence clearly supports voluntariness."4 4
2. Criminal Jury Instructions
It was noted in State v. Hinkle45 that "[a]s a general rule, the refusal to give
a requested jury instruction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. By contrast, the
question of whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law, and the
review is de novo.""56
The case of State v. Derr457 presented an opportunity to clarify how the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reviews jury instruction assignments of
error. Justice Cleckley indicated that "[w]hether facts are sufficient to justify the
delivery of a particular instruction is reviewed by this Court under an abuse of
discretion standard. In criminal cases where a conviction results, the evidence and
any reasonable inferences are considered in the light most favorable to the
prosecution.""45 The opinion then set out the circumstances that would permit
reversal of a case based upon the refusal of a trial court to give a requested jury
instruction:
A trial court's refusal to give a requested instruction is reversible
error only if: (1) the instruction is a correct statement of the law;
(2) it is not substantially covered in the charge actually given to the
jury; and (3) it concerns an important point in the trial so that the
failure to give it seriously impairs a defendant's ability to
453 Id at Syl. Pt. 2.
454 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
455 489 S.E.2d 257 (W. Va. 1996).
456 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
457 451 S.E.2d 731 (W. Va. 1994).
458 Id. at Syl. Pt. 12.
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effectively present a given defense.4"9
Justice Cleckley revisited appellate review of jury instructions in State v.
Bradshaw:4
60
Jury instructions are reviewed by determining whether the charge,
reviewed as a whole, sufficiently instructed the jury so they
understood the issues involved and were not misled by the law. A
jury instruction cannot be dissected on appeal; instead, the entire
instruction is looked at when determining its accuracy. The trial
court, therefore, has broad discretion in formulating its charge to
the jury, so long as it accurately reflects the law. Deference is
given to the circuit court's discretion concerning the specific
wording of the instruction, and the precise extent and character of
any specific instruction will be reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.461
The case of State v. Guthrie 2 provided elaboration on appellate review of
criminal jury instructions:
A trial court's instructions to the jury must be a correct statement
of the law and supported by the evidence. Jury instructions are
reviewed by determining whether the charge, reviewed as a whole,
sufficiently instructed the jury so they understood the issues
involved and were not mislead by the law. A jury instruction
cannot be dissected on appeal; instead, the entire instruction is
looked at when determining its accuracy. A trial court, therefore,
has broad discretion in formulating its charge to the jury, so long
as the charge accurately reflects the law. Deference is given to a
trial court's discretion concerning the specific wording of the
instruction, and the precise extent and character of any specific
instruction will be reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. 3
459 Id. at SylPt. 11.
460 457 S.E.2d 456 (W. Va.1995).
461 Id. at Syl. Pt. 15.
462 461 S.E.2d 163 (W. Va. 1995).
463 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
Special]
5
Davis and Palmer: Appellate Procedure
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1998
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
3. Civil Jury Instructions
In the civil case of Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation, Inc.,'"
Justice Cleckley held that
[t]he formulation ofjury instructions is within the broad discretion
of a circuit court, and a circuit court's giving of an instruction is
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. A verdict should
not be disturbed based on the formulation of the language of the
jury instructions so long as the instructions given as a whole are
accurate and fair to both parties.46
4. Motion to Suppress
Justice Cleckley took a moment in State v. Stuar 66 to set out the general
standard of review used by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in
examining a motion to suppress ruling. The opinion held that
[o]n appeal, legal conclusions made with regard to suppression
determinations are reviewed de novo. Factual determinations upon
which these legal conclusions are based are reviewed under the
clearly erroneous standard. In addition, factual findings based, at
least in part, on determinations of witness credibility are accorded
great deference. 67
Further elucidation on the review standard of a motion to suppress ruling
was set out in State v. Lacy 68
When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, an appellate
court should construe all facts in the light most favorable to the
State, as it was the prevailing party below. Because of the highly
fact-specific nature of a motion to suppress, particular deference is
464 459 S.E.2d 374 (W. Va. 1995).
465 Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.
466 452 S.E.2d 886 (W. Va. 1994).
467 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
468 468 S.E.2d 719 (W. Va. 1996).
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given to the findings of the circuit court because it had the
opportunity to observe the witnesses and to hear testimony on the
issues. Therefore, the circuit court's factual findings are reviewed
for clear error.469
The opinion went on to illuminate the review for a specific type of suppression
ruling:
In contrast to a review of the circuit court's factual findings, the
ultimate determination as to whether a search or seizure was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Section 6 of Article III of the West Virginia
Constitution is a question of law that is reviewed de novo.
Similarly, an appellate court reviews de novo whether a search
warrant was too broad. Thus, a circuit court's denial of a motion
to suppress evidence will be affirmed unless it is unsupported by
substantial evidence, based on an erroneous interpretation of the
law, or, based on the entire record, it is clear that a mistake has
been made.47°
5. Injection of Unlawful Factors in a Criminal Case
The decision in State v. Guthrie4 71 carved out a tough standard of review
for alleged injections of specific unlawful factors in a criminal case:
Appellate courts give strict scrutiny to cases involving the alleged
wrongful injection of race, gender, or religion in criminal cases.
Where these issues are wrongfully injected, reversal is usually the
result. Where race, gender, or religion is a relevant factor in the
case, its admission is not prohibited unless the probative value of
the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. 72
469 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
470 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
471 461 S.E.2d 163 (W. Va. 1995).
472 Id. at Syl. Pt. 9.
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6. Discovery Violation
In State ex rel. Rusen v. Hill,473 Justice Cleckley was able to address the
critical issue of criminal prosecution discovery violations. The opinion concisely
laid out the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' analysis of prejudice caused
by discovery violations. Justice Cleckley wrote that "[t]he traditional appellate
standard for determining prejudice for discovery violations under Rule 16 of the
West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure involves a two-pronged analysis: (1) did
the non-disclosure surprise the defendant on a material fact, and (2) did it hamper
the preparation and presentation of the defendant's case.""47
7. Summary Judgment
In Painter v. Peay,7 s the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals'
standard of review for summary judgment was succinctly articulated. Justice
Cleckley ruled that "[a] circuit court's entry of summary judgment is reviewed de
novo."
476
8. Partial Final Judgment Order
The standard of review of a final judgment order disposing of some claims
or parties, but not all, was set out in Province v. Province:
4 77
In reviewing a circuit court's certification under Rule 54(b) of the
West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court applies a
two-prong test. First, we scrutinize de novo the circuit court's
evaluation of the interrelationship of the claims, in order to decide
whether the circuit court completely disposed of one or more
claims, which is a prerequisite for an appeal under this rule. As to
the second prong of the inquiry under the rule - whether there is
any just reason for delay - this Court accords the circuit court's
determination considerably more deference than its first-prong
473 454 S.E.2d 427 (W. Va. 1994).
474 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
475 451 S.E.2d 755 (W. Va. 1994).
476 Id. at Syl. Pt 1.
477 473 S.E.2d 894 (W. Va. 1996).
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determination. The circuit court's assessment that there is "no just
reason for delay" will not be disturbed unless the circuit court's
conclusion was clearly unreasonable, because the task of balancing
the contending factors is peculiarly one for the trial judge, who can
explore all the facets of a case.47
9. Motion to Dismiss
The standard of review of an order dismissing a complaint was set out in
State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac-Buick, Inc.479 The opinion held that
"[a]ppellate review of a circuit court's order granting a motion to dismiss a
complaint is de novo."48
10. Case Transfer Ruling
The decision in State ex rel. Smith v. Maynard81 addressed two
requirements for the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to review a case
transfer ruling under West Virginia Code section 56-1-1(b). First, it was held that
"[i]n order for this Court to review a circuit court's decision under the factors listed
under W. Va. Code, 56-1-1(b) (1986), the circuit court must provide a sufficiently
detailed record that shows the basis for its decision.""42 Second, "[w]here a circuit
court does not abuse its discretion in transferring cases under W. Va. Code,
56-1-1(b) (1986), this Court will not prohibit such transfer.""4 3
The case of Cannelton Industries, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. of
America4" also gave Justice Cleckley an opportunity to succinctly set out the basis
upon which the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals would reverse a forum
non conveniens ruling. The decision held that "[a] circuit court's decision to invoke
the doctrine of forum non conveniens will not be reversed unless it is found that the
478 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
479 461 S.E.2d 516 (W. Va. 1995).
480 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
481 454 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1994).
482 Id. at Syl. Pt. 8.
483 Id. at Syl. Pt. 7.
484 460 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1994).
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circuit court abused its discretion. 4 5
11. Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
The case of Mildred L.M. v. John O.F.486 enabled Justice Cleckley to
establish a bright line for the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in reviewing
a ruling on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict:
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, it is not the task of the appellate court
reviewing facts to determine how it would have ruled on the
evidence presented. Its task is to determine whether the evidence
was such that a reasonable trier of fact might have reached the
decision below. Thus, in ruling on a motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, the evidence must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. If on review, the
evidence is shown to be legally insufficient to sustain the verdict,
it is the obligation of this Court to reverse the circuit court and to
order judgment for the appellant.487
12. Ruling on Property Sold under Specific Statute
The sale of property by the division of highways pursuant to West Virginia
Code section 17-2A-19 was at issue in Mills v. Van Kirk.48 The Mills opinion set
out the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' review when it examines
decisions construing the statute by the division's commissioner and circuit courts:
A circuit court's interpretation of W. Va. Code, 17-2A-19, is
entitled to no special deference and is subject to our plenary and
independent review. However, absent clear legislative intent to the
contrary, we do afford deference to a reasonable construction of
the statute by the Commissioner because he has policymaking
485 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
486 452 S.E.2d 436 (W. Va. 1994).
487 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
488 453 S.E.2d 678 (W. Va. 1994).
[Vol. 100:
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authority with regard to the statute.489
13. Lawyer Disciplinary Matters
The standard of review by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in
lawyer disciplinary matters was set out in Committee on Legal Ethics of the West
Virginia State Bar v. McCorkle.490 In that case Justice Cleckley wrote,
[a] de novo standard applies to a review of the adjudicatory record
made before the Committee on Legal Ethics of the West Virginia
State Bar as to questions of law, questions of application of the law
to the facts, and questions of appropriate sanctions; this Court
gives respectful consideration to the Committee's
recommendations while ultimately exercising its own independent
judgment. On the other hand, substantial deference is given to the
Committee's findings of fact, unless such findings are not
supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record.491
14. Decision of Unemployment Compensation Board
The decision in Adkins v. Gatson 4 articulated the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals' standard of review of unemployment compensation decisions by
the board of review of the department of employment security. The opinion held
that
[t]he findings of fact of the Board of Review of the West Virginia
Department of Employment Security are entitled to substantial
deference unless a reviewing court believes the findings are clearly
wrong. If the question on review is one purely of law, no
deference is given and the standard ofjudicial review by the court
is de novo.493
489 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
490 452 S.E.2d 377 (W. Va. 1994).
491 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
492 453 S.E.2d 395 (W. Va. 1994).
493 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
Special]
11
Davis and Palmer: Appellate Procedure
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1998
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
15. Awarding Attorney Fee as Sanction
It was held in Bartles v. Hinkle494 that "[a]n attorney's fee awarded as a
sanction that explicitly is authorized by Rule 37(b) of the West Virginia Rules of
Civil Procedure rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and the exercise of
that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal except in cases of abuse,"
495
16. Circuit Court Adoption of Family Law Master Findings
In Burnside v. Burnside,496 Justice Cleckley outlined the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals' standard of review of findings made by a family law
master and adopted by a circuit court:
In reviewing challenges to findings made by a family law master
that also were adopted by a circuit court, a three-pronged standard
of review is applied. Under these circumstances, a final equitable
distribution order is reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard; the underlying factual findings are reviewed under a
clearly erroneous standard; and questions of law and statutory
interpretations are subject to a de novo review.497
17. Nonconstitutional Harmless Error Review
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' standard of review of
nonconstitutional error was articulated in State v. Bradshaw.498 Bradshaw held,
"[i]n the realm of nonconstitutional error, the appropriate test for harmlessness is
whether we can say with fair assurance, after stripping the erroneous evidence from
the whole, that the remaining evidence independently was sufficient to support the
verdict and that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error."'49
494 472 S.E.2d 827 (W. Va. 1996).
495 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
496 460 S.E.2d 264 (W. Va. 1995).
497 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
498 457 S.E.2d 456 (W. Va. 1995).
499 Id. at Syl. Pt. 13.
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State v. Blake 0 stated,
[a]ssessments of harmless error are necessarily content-specific.
Although erroneous evidentiary rulings alone do not lead to
automatic reversal, a reviewing court is obligated to reverse where
the improper exclusion of evidence places the underlying fairness
of the entire trial in doubt or where the exclusion affected the
substantial rights of a criminal defendant."°
18. Decision of Tax Commissioner
Frymier-Halloran v. Paige5" ruled that "[o]nce a full record is developed,
both the circuit court and this Court will review the findings and conclusions of the
Tax Commissioner under a clearly erroneous and abuse of discretion standard
unless the incorrect legal standard was applied.""5 3
19. Interpreting Rules of Evidence
In Gentry v. Mangum,"' the court ruled that "[a]n interpretation of the West
Virginia Rules of Evidence presents a question of law subject to de novo review."'
20. Decision of Successor Judge
In Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation, Inc °6 Justice Cleckley
announced the standard of review used by the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals in its review of a decision by a successor judge. The opinion held,
[o]nce a successor judge is properly assigned pursuant to Rule 63
500 478 S.E.2d 550 (W. Va. 1996).
501 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
502 458 S.E.2d 780 (W. Va. 1995).
503 Id. at SylPt. 5.
504 466 S.E.2d 171 (W. Va. 1995).
505 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
506 459 S.E.2d 374 (W. Va. 1995).
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of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule XVII of
the West Virginia Trial Court Rules for Trial Courts of Record, his
or her decision or judgment is to be reviewed on appeal under the
same standard that would have been applied to the decision of the
original trial judge. To do otherwise would disrupt the
administration of justice. To the extent that our prior cases are
inconsistent with this decision, they are expressly overruled. 7
21. Review of an Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
The case of State v. Miller.°8 addressed the standard of review for a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel:
In the West Virginia courts, claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel are to'be governed by the two-pronged test established in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.
ED.2d 674 (1984): (1) Counsel's performance was deficient under
an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceedings would have been different. °9
The opinion then went on to hold that
[i]n reviewing counsel's performance, courts must apply an
objective standard and determine whether, in light of all the
circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the
broad range of professionally competent assistance while at the
same time refraining from engaging in hindsight or
second-guessing of trial counsel's strategic decisions. Thus, a
reviewing court asks whether a reasonable lawyer would have
acted, under the circumstances, as defense counsel acted in the
case at issue. 0
507 Id at Syl. Pt. 1.
508 459 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va. 1995).
509 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
510 Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.
[Vol. 100:
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Review of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was also the subject
in State ex rel. Daniel v. Legursky.5" Justice Cleckley noted in Daniel that
[i]n deciding ineffective of assistance claims, a court need not
address both prongs of the conjunctive standard of Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L. ED.2d 674
(1984), and State v. Miller, 194 W. Va. 3,459 S.E.2d 114 (1995),
but may dispose of such a claim based solely on a petitioner's
failure to meet either prong of the test."2
It was also held that
[a] defendant can only obtain reversal on ineffective assistance of
counsel grounds if the error complained of occurred at a critical
stage in the adversary proceedings. This is true because Section 14
of Article III of the West Virginia Constitution and the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantee the right
to counsel only at critical stages.513
The Daniel opinion focused on specific factors concerning a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel:
The fulcrum for any ineffective assistance of counsel claim is the
adequacy of counsel's investigation. Although there is a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance, and judicial scrutiny of
counsel's performance must be highly deferential, counsel must at
a minimum conduct a reasonable investigation enabling him or her
to make informed decisions about how best to represent criminal
clients. Thus, the presumption is simply inappropriate if counsel's
strategic decisions are made after an inadequate investigation.514
The opinion concluded that
511 465 S.E.2d 416 (W. Va. 1995).
512 Id. at Syl.Pt. 5.
513 Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.
514 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
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[i]ndetermining whether counsel's conduct falls within the broad
range of professionally acceptable conduct, this Court will not
view counsel's conduct through the lens of hindsight. Courts are
to avoid the use of hindsight to elevate a possible mistake into a
deficiency of constitutional proportion. Rather, under the rule of
contemporary assessment, an attorney's actions must be examined
according to what was known and reasonable at the time the
attorney made his or her choices.1 5
22. General Evidentiary and Procedural Rulings
The standard of review for evaluating evidentiary and procedural rulings
was touched upon in McDougal v. MCammon 6 Justice Cleckley wrote,
[t]he West Virginia Rules of Evidence and the West Virginia Rules
of Civil Procedure allocate significant discretion to the trial court
in making evidentiary and procedural rulings. Thus, rulings on the
admissibility of evidence and the appropriateness of a particular
sanction for discovery violations are committed to the discretion of
the trial court. Absent a few exceptions, this Court will review
evidentiary and procedural rulings of the circuit court under an
abuse of discretion standard.1
23. Trial Management
State v. Miller5 8 held that "[tlo succeed on an abuse of discretion claim
regarding the judicial management of a criminal trial, a defendant must point to a
specific rule or statutory violation and then must show that the measures or
procedures taken by the trial judge either actually or inherently were prejudicial.51
515 Id at Syl. Pt. 4.
516 455 S.E.2d 788 (W. Va. 1995).
517 Id at Syl. Pt. 1.
518 476 S.E.2d 535 (W. Va. 1996).
519 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
[V/ol. 100:
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24. Sufficiency of Evidence in Criminal Case
Justice Cleckley took the liberty in State v. Guthrie521 to expand review for
a claim of insufficiency of evidence to sustain a criminal conviction. The opinion
held initially that:
The function of an appellate court when reviewing the sufficiency
of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the
evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if
believed, is sufficient to convince a reasonable person of the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the relevant
inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. 21
The decision in Guthrie then set out specific appellate review guideposts:
A criminal defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
to support a conviction takes on a heavy burden. An appellate
court must review all the evidence, whether direct or
circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the prosecution and
must credit all inferences and credibility assessments that the jury
might have drawn in favor of the prosecution. The evidence need
not be inconsistent with every conclusion save that of guilt so long
as the jury can find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Credibility
determinations are for a jury and not an appellate court. Finally,
a jury verdict should be set aside only when the record contains no
evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which the jury
could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. To the extent that our
prior cases are inconsistent, they are expressly overruled.5"
Justice Cleckley revisited the sufficiency of the evidence in State v.
520 461 S.E.2d 163 (W. Va. 1995).
521 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
522 Id at Syl. Pt. 3.
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LaRock.52
When a criminal defendant undertakes a sufficiency challenge, all
the evidence, direct and circumstantial, must be viewed from the
prosecutor's coign of vantage, and the viewer must accept all
reasonable inferences from it that are consistent with the verdict.
This rule requires the trial court judge to resolve all evidentiary
conflicts and credibility questions in the prosecution's favor;
moreover, as among competing inferences of which two or more
are plausible, the judge must choose the inference that best fits the
prosecution's theory of guilt. 24
25. Parole Statute or Double Jeopardy Claim
In State v. Sears,'5 Justice Cleckley held that "[b]oth the construction and
scope of W. Va. Code, 62-12-13(a)(1)(A) (1988), the parole statute, and a double
jeopardy claim are reviewed de novo."526
26. Alleged Breach of Plea Agreement
Appellate analysis of an alleged breach of a plea agreement was succinctly
addressed in State ex rel. Brewer v. Starcher:
27
Cases involving plea agreements allegedly breached by either the
prosecution or the circuit court present two separate issues for
appellate consideration: one factual and the other legal. First, the
factual findings that undergird a circuit court's ultimate
determination are reviewed only for clear error. These are the
factual questions as to what the terms of the agreement were and
what was the conduct of the defendant, prosecution, and the circuit
court. If disputed, the factual questions are to be resolved initially
by the circuit court, and these factual determinations are reviewed
523 470 S.E.2d 613 (W. Va. 1996).
524 Id at Syl. Pt. 2.
525 468 S.E.2d 324 (W. Va. 1996).
526 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
527 465 S.E.2d 185 (W. Va. 1995).
[Vol. I00:
18
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 100, Iss. 5 [1998], Art. 24
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol100/iss5/24
A TRIBUTE TO FRANKLIN D. CLECKLEY
under the clearly erroneous standard. Second, in contrast, the
circuit court's articulation and application of legal principles is
scrutinized under a less deferential standard. It is a legal question
whether specific conduct complained about breached the plea
agreement. Therefore, whether the disputed conduct constitutes a
breach is a question of law that is reviewed de novo.528
27. Review of Challenge to Indictment
In State v. Miller,529 the court ruled that "[g]enerally, the sufficiency of an
indictment is reviewed de novo. An indictment need only meet minimal
constitutional standards, and the sufficiency of an indictment is determined by
practical rather than technical considerations."53 ° The opinion also held,
Rule 12(b)(2) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure
requires that a defendant must raise any objection to an indictment
prior to trial. Although a challenge to a defective indictment is
never waived, this Court literally will construe an indictment in
favor of validity where a defendant fails timely to challenge its
sufficiency. Without objection, the indictment should be upheld
unless it is so defective that it does not, by any reasonable
construction, charge an offense under West Virginia law or for
which the defendant was convicted.531
28. Statutory Interpretation Generally
In West Virginia Human Rights Commission v. Garretson,532 Justice
Cleckley noted that "[i]nterpreting a statute presents a purely legal question subject
to our de novo review on which neither party bears the burden of proof."533 In Mills
528 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
529 476 S.E.2d 535 (W. Va. 1996).
530 Id at Syl. Pt. 2.
531 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
532 468 S.E.2d 733 (W. Va. 1996).
533 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
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v. Van Kirk,534 Justice Cleckley pieced together several principles to lay down the
following rule:
When interpreting a statute, [t]he primary object in construing a
statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the
Legislature. To determine the true intent of the legislature, courts
are to examine the statute in its entirety and not select any single
part, provision, section, sentence, phrase or word.535
29. Review of Administrative Rule or Regulation
The case of Appalachian Power Co. v. State Tax Department of West
Virginia536 established this court's review of administrative rules or regulations.
Justice Cleckley noted as general matter, that "[i]nterpreting a statute or an
administrative rule or regulation presents a purely legal question subject to de novo
review." '537 The case held,
[i]n reviewing a rule or regulation of an administrative agency, a
West Virginia court must first decide whether the rule is
interpretive or legislative. If it is interpretive, a reviewing court is
to give it only the deference it commands. If it is a legislative rule,
the court first must determine its validity. Assuming its validity,
the two-pronged analysis from Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81
L. ED.2d 694 (1984), should be applied.538
The opinion in Appalachian Power next ruled that
[j]udicial review of an agency's legislative rule and the
construction of a statute that it administers involves two separate
but interrelated questions, only the second of which furnishes an
occasion for deference. In deciding whether an administrative
534 453 S.E.2d 678 (W. Va. 1994).
535 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)
536 466 S.E.2d 424 (W. Va. 1995).
537 Id at Syl. Pt. 1.
538 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
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agency's position should be sustained, a reviewing court applies
the standards set out by the United States Supreme Court in
Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984). The court
first must ask whether the Legislature has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intention of the Legislature is
clear, that is the end of the matter, and the agency's position only
can be upheld if it conforms to the Legislature's intent. No
deference is due the agency's interpretation at this stage. 39
Justice Cleckley concluded Appalachian Power by holding,
[i]f legislative intent is not clear, a reviewing court may not simply
impose its own construction of the statute in reviewing a legislative
rule. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute. A valid legislative rule is entitled to substantial deference
by the reviewing court. As a properly promulgated legislative rule,
the rule can be ignored only if the agency has exceeded its
constitutional or statutory authority or is arbitrary or capricious.
W.Va. Code, 29A-4-2 (1982)."'
The case of West Virginia Health Care Cost Review Authority v. Boone
Memorial Hospital" provided further principles involving the review standard of
administrative regulations. Justice Cleckley stated that
[o]nce a disputed regulation is legislatively approved, it has the
force of a statute itself. Being an act of the West Virginia
Legislature, it is entitled to more than mere deference; it is entitled
to controlling weight. As authorized by legislation, a legislative
rule should be ignored only if the agency has exceeded its
constitutional or statutory authority or is arbitrary or capricious. 2
539 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
540 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
541 472 S.E.2d 411 (W. Va. 1996).
542 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
Special]
21
Davis and Palmer: Appellate Procedure
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1998
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
It was further said that
[i]f the language of an enactment is clear and within the
constitutional authority of the law-making body which passed it,
courts must read the relevant law according to its unvarnished
meaning, without any judicial embroidery. Even when there is
conflict between the legislative rule and the initial statute, that
conflict will be resolved using ordinary canons of interpretation. 43
30. Findings and Conclusions of Circuit Court
Justice Cleckley laid down the general rule regarding review of findings of
fact made by a circuit court in the case of In re Tiffany Marie S.:5"
Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court are subject
to de novo review, when an action, such as an abuse and neglect
case, is tried upon the facts without a jury, the circuit court shall
make a determination based upon the evidence and shall make
findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether such child is
abused or neglected. These findings shall not be set aside by a
reviewing court unless clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly
erroneous when, although there is evidence to support the finding,
the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. However,
a reviewing court may not overturn a finding simply because it
would have decided the case differently, and it must affirm a
finding if the circuit court's account of the evidence is plausible in
light of the record viewed in its entirety. 5
In State ex rel. Cooper v. Caperton,"6 Justice Cleckley qualified the general
rule regarding the standard of review of findings of fact. Cooper stated,
[g]enerally, findings of fact are reviewed for clear error and
543 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
544 470 S.E.2d 177 (W. Va. 1996).
545 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
546 470 S.E.2d 162 (W. Va. 1996).
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conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. However, ostensible
findings of fact, which entail the application of law or constitute
legal judgments which transcend ordinary factual determinations,
must be reviewed de novo. The sufficiency of the information
presented at trial to support a finding that a constitutional predicate
has been satisfied presents a question of law. 7
Additionally, in Brown v. Gobble,548 a specific test was developed for
determining when the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals would not defer to
the findings of a trial court. Justice Cleckley indicated that
[t]he deference accorded to a circuit court sitting as factfinder may
evaporate if upon review of its findings the appellate court
determines that: (1) a relevant factor that should have been given
significant weight is not considered; (2) all proper factors, and no
improper factors, are considered, but the circuit court in weighing
those factors commits an error ofjudgment; or (3) the circuit court
failed to exercise any discretion at all in issuing its decision.49
In Public Citizen, Inc. v. First National Bank in Fairmont,550 the court held
that
[iun reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of the
circuit court made after a bench trial, a two-pronged deferential
standard of review is applied. The final order and the ultimate
disposition are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, and
the circuit court's underlying factual findings are reviewed under
a clearly erroneous standard. Questions of law are subject to a de
novo review.55'
547 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
548 474 S.E.2d 489 (W. Va. 1996).
549 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
550 480 S.E.2d 538 (W. Va. 1996).
551 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
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31. Civil Service Commission
The case of In re Queen552 was used by Justice Cleckley to address the
standard of review used for the civil service commission of correctional officers:
An adjudicative decision of the Correctional Officers' Civil
Service Commission should not be overturned by an appellate
court unless it was clearly erroneous, arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.
Review under this standard is narrow and the reviewing court looks
to the Civil Service Commission's action to determine whether the
record reveals that a substantial and rational basis exists for its
decision.553
It was also said that
[a]n appellate court may reverse a decision of the Correctional
Officers' Civil Service Commission as clearly wrong or arbitrary
or capricious only if the Commission used a misapplication of the
law, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,
offered an explanation that ran counter to the evidence before the
Commission, or offered one that was so implausible that it could
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
Commission expertise.554
Queen stated that "[t]he 'clearly wrong' and the 'arbitrary and capricious'
standards of review are deferential ones which presume an agency's actions are
valid as long as the decision is supported by substantial evidence or by a rational
basis."555 Queen further held that "'[s]ubstantial evidence' requires more than a
mere scintilla. It is such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. If an administrative agency's factual finding is
supported by substantial evidence, it is conclusive. 556
552 473 S.E.2d 483 (W. Va. 1996).
553 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
554 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
555 Id at Syl. PL 3.
556 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
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C. Preserving Issue for Appeal
In State v. Honaker,"7 Justice Cleckley addressed the prerequisites for
preserving two specific issues for appellate review. The opinion held that "[t]o
raise and preserve for appellate review the claim of improper impeachment of the
defendant or improper rebuttal by the use of prejudicial collateral evidence, a
defendant must testify or the rebuttal evidence must be introduced at trial.""5 8 The
case of McDougal v. McCammon559 held that "[i]n order to preserve for appeal the
claim of unfair surprise as the basis for the exclusion of evidence, the aggrieved
party must move for a continuance or recess." 60 As a general matter, in State ex
rel. Cooper v. Caperton,56 the court held that "[tio preserve an issue for appellate
review, a party must articulate it with such sufficient distinctiveness to alert a
circuit court to the nature of the claimed defect." 562
D. Writ of Prohibition
In State ex rel. Hoover v. Berger,563 the opinion set out factors the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals considers in determining whether to issue a writ
of prohibition:
In determining whether to entertain and issue the writ of
prohibition for cases not involving an absence of jurisdiction but
only where it is claimed that the lower tribunal exceeded its
legitimate powers, this Court will examine five factors: (1) whether
the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as
direct appeal, to obtain the desired relief; (2) whether the petitioner
will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on
appeal; (3) whether the lower tribunal's order is clearly erroneous
557 454 S.E.2d 96 (W. Va. 1994).
558 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
559 455 S.E.2d 788 (W. Va. 1995).
560 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
561 470 S.E.2d 162 (W. Va. 1996).
562 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
563 483 S.E.2d 12 (W. Va. 1996).
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as a matter of law; (4) whether the lower tribunal's order is an oft
repeated error or manifests persistent disregard for either
procedural or substantive law; and (5) whether the lower tribunal's
order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first
impression. These factors are general guidelines that serve as a
useful starting point for determining whether a discretionary writ
of prohibition should issue. Although all five factors need not be
satisfied, it is clear that the third factor, the existence of clear error
as a matter of law, should be given substantial weight.5"
Seeking a writ of prohibition to quash a subpoena was touched upon in
State ex rel. Doe v. TroisL5" The case held in that case that "[i]n situations where
the refusal of a motion to quash a subpoena based on the attorney-client privilege
could result in imminent and irreparable harm, petitioning for a writ of prohibition
is the appropriate method for challenging the subpoena."566
Use of the writ of prohibition was addressed in State ex rel. US. Fidelity
and Guaranty Co. v. Canady.567 In that case Justice Cleckley held that "[w]hen a
discovery order involves the probable invasion of confidential materials that are
exempted from discovery under Rule 26(b)(1) and (3) of the West Virginia Rules
of Civil Procedure, the exercise of this Court's original jurisdiction is
appropriate.
568
E. Writ of Mandamus
Issues involving the writ of mandamus were addressed in Gribben v.
Kirk.569 Gribben stated that "[m]andamus will lie against a State official to adjust
prospectively his or her conduct to bring it into compliance with any statutory or
constitutional standard.""57 The opinion also ruled that "[t]he crucial date for
564 Id at Syl. Pt. 4.
565 459 S.E.2d 139 (W. Va. 1995).
566 Id at Syl. Pt. 2.
567 460 S.E.2d 677 (W. Va. 1995).
568 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
569 466 S.E.2d 147 (W. Va. 1995).
570 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
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drawing a line between prospective and retroactive relief should be the initiation of
the relevant mandamus action and not the date ofjudgment." '571
Justice Cleckley took the opportunity to outline the test for granting a writ
of mandamus in State ex rel. Sowards v. County Commission of Lincoln County."
The opinion held that
[m]andamus is a drastic remedy to be invoked only in
extraordinary situations; therefore, a party seeking such a writ must
satisfy three conditions: (1) there are no adequate means for the
party to obtain the desired relief; (2) the party has a clear and
indisputable right to the issuance of the writ; and (3) there is a
legal duty on the part of the respondent to do that which the
petitioner seeks to compel. 3
It was said in State ex rel. School Building Authority of West Virginia v.
Marockie74 that
[a] writ of mandamus is a proper method of testing the legality of
a bond issue before the bonds are actually issued where the issue
presented is one for which there has been a tradition of judicial
accessibility and where immediate judicial access would play a
significant and positive role in the resolution of the particular
constitutional problem in question.5
F. Plain Error Rule
The plain error rule was established in State v. Miller.576 Justice Cleckley
held that "[t]o trigger application of the 'plain error' doctrine, there must be (1) an
error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; and (4) seriously affects the
571 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
572 474 S.E.2d 919 (W. Va. 1996).
573 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
574 481 S.E.2d 730 (W. Va. 1996).
575 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
576 459 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va. 1995).
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fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings."' " The opinion
then went on to make a distinction between "waiver" and "forfeiture" in the context
of the plain error doctrine:
Under the "plain error" doctrine, "waiver" of error must be
distinguished from "forfeiture" of a right. A deviation from a rule
of law is error unless there is a waiver. When there has been a
knowing and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right, there is no error and the inquiry as to the effect of a
deviation from the rule of law need not be determined. By
contrast, mere forfeiture of a right - the failure to make timely
assertion of the right - does not extinguish the error. In such a
circumstance, it is necessary to continue the inquiry and to
determine whether the error is "plain." To be "plain," the error
must be "clear" or "obvious. 578
Miller concluded by explaining the import of the third factor in its plain
error test:
Assuming that an error is "plain," the inquiry must proceed to its
last step and a determination made as to whether it affects the
substantial rights of the defendant. To affect substantial rights
means the error was prejudicial. It must have affected the outcome
of the proceedings in the circuit court, and the defendant rather
than the prosecutor bears the burden of persuasion with respect to
prejudice. 7 9
The decision in State v. LaRock80 elaborated further on the plain error rule:
An unpreserved error is deemed plain and affects substantial rights
only if the reviewing court finds the lower court skewed the
fundamental faimess or basic integrity of the proceedings in some
major respect. In clear terms, the plain error rule should be
577 Id. at Syl. Pt. 7.
578 Id. at Syl. Pt. 8.
579 Id. at Syl. PL 9.
580 470 S.E.2d 613 (W. Va. 1996).
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exercised only to avoid a miscarriage ofjustice. The discretionary
authority of this Court invoked by lesser errors should be exercised
sparingly and should be reserved for the correction of those few
errors that seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of the judicial proceedings. 81
The plain error rule was refined further in State v. Marple 82 "For the
purposes of West Virginia's 'plain error' rule, a 'plain' error is one that is clear and
uncontroverted at the time of appeal."583 The opinion also held that
[i]n determining whether the assigned plain error affected the
'substantial rights' of a defendant, the defendant need not establish
that in a trial without the error a reasonable jury would have
acquitted; rather, the defendant need only demonstrate the jury
verdict in his or her case was actually affected by the assigned but
unobjected to error.8 4
Marple concluded by holding that
[p]lain error review creates a limited exception to the general
forfeiture policy pronounced in Rule 103(a)(1) of the West
Virginia Rules of Evidence, in that where a circuit court's error
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the
judicial process, an appellate court has the discretion to correct
error despite the defendant's failure to object. This salutary and
protective device recognizes that in a criminal case, where a
defendant's liberty interest is at stake, the rule of forfeiture should
bend slightly, if necessary, to prevent a grave injustice. 85
It was said in State v. Crabtree5 6 that
581 Id. at Syl. Pt. 7.
582 475 S.E.2d 47 (W. Va. 1996).
583 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
584 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
585 Id at Syl. Pt. 1.
586 482 S.E.2d 605 (W. Va. 1996).
Special]
29
Davis and Palmer: Appellate Procedure
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1998
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
[t]he first inquiry under the "plain error rule" codified in Rule
52(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure is whether
"error" in fact has been committed. Deviation from a rule of law
is error unless it is waived. Waiver is the intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right. When there has
been such a knowing waiver, there is no error and the inquiry as to
the effect of the deviation from a rule of law need not be
determined." 7
G. Cumulative Error Doctrine
Application of the cumulative error doctrine in civil litigation was
addressed in Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation, Inc."' The opinion held
that "[t]he cumulative error doctrine may be applied in a civil case when it is
apparent that justice requires a reversal of a judgment because the presence of
several seemingly inconsequential errors has made any resulting judgment
inherently unreliable."5"9
XXI. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Free Speech Clause
The case of In re Hey59 provided Justice Cleckley with an opportunity to
construe the constitutional right of free speech for judicial officials:
A judge may not be disciplined consistent with the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution or with Section 7 of
Article III of the West Virginia Constitution for his remarks during
a radio interview in which he discussed his own disciplinary
proceeding, criticized a member of his investigative panel, and
stated his intention to take some reactive and lawful measure
against the panel member. 91
587 Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.
588 459 S.E.2d 374 (W. Va. 1995).
589 Id. at Syl. Pt. 8.
590 452 S.E.2d 24 (W. Va. 1994).
591 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
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